Flexibility and Differentiation
Posted: Sun Apr 06, 2025 7:02 am
In this contribution the authors focus on the impact of differentiated integration on the European Parliament, using comparison in certain cases and imagining possible scenarios aimed at “rationalizing” the institutional consequences of the asymmetric choice. The sixth chapter by Ott (“Differentiation through Accession Law: Free Movement Rights in an Enlarged European Union”) analyses in detail the various typologies of legal differentiation introduced by the latest generations of accession treaties, with particular regard to the internal market.
The seventh chapter (“A Plea for Allowing National Differentiation in the Fundamental Rights Domain”) closes the first part of the volume and was written by de Visser and van der Mei. The subject of the contribution are some reflections on the relationship between Constitutional Charters and Treaties in the aftermath of the Melloni ruling . The Authors question what space this important decision buy phone number list may have left for differentiation in the protection of fundamental rights.
The second part of the volume opens with a very interesting essay by Van den Bogaert and Borger dedicated to the asymmetry that characterizes the Monetary Union (“Differentiated Integration in EMU”). The chapter analyses three forms of differentiation “in participation, in objectives and instruments and in law” (p. 209). In the ninth chapter (“Differentiated Integration in the Field of Economic and Monetary Policy and the Use of “(Semi-)Extra” Union Legal Instruments – The Case for “Inter Se Treaty Amendments””) Herrmann addresses the issue of the use of instruments formally external to the instrumentalities of EU law in the strict sense. This is the well-known issue of the choice of measures formally belonging to the scope of public international law (such as, for example, international treaties), but in reality somehow connected to Union law (for example, through clauses such as that of art. 2 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance , the so-called Fiscal Compact ).
The seventh chapter (“A Plea for Allowing National Differentiation in the Fundamental Rights Domain”) closes the first part of the volume and was written by de Visser and van der Mei. The subject of the contribution are some reflections on the relationship between Constitutional Charters and Treaties in the aftermath of the Melloni ruling . The Authors question what space this important decision buy phone number list may have left for differentiation in the protection of fundamental rights.
The second part of the volume opens with a very interesting essay by Van den Bogaert and Borger dedicated to the asymmetry that characterizes the Monetary Union (“Differentiated Integration in EMU”). The chapter analyses three forms of differentiation “in participation, in objectives and instruments and in law” (p. 209). In the ninth chapter (“Differentiated Integration in the Field of Economic and Monetary Policy and the Use of “(Semi-)Extra” Union Legal Instruments – The Case for “Inter Se Treaty Amendments””) Herrmann addresses the issue of the use of instruments formally external to the instrumentalities of EU law in the strict sense. This is the well-known issue of the choice of measures formally belonging to the scope of public international law (such as, for example, international treaties), but in reality somehow connected to Union law (for example, through clauses such as that of art. 2 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance , the so-called Fiscal Compact ).